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BIOGRAPHY BEHIND THE SCENES: 
BENJAMIN VICTOR COHEN AND THE 
SPIRIT OF THE NEW DEAL 
William Lasser 
Clemson University 
Benjamin Victor Cohen was one of the most important and 
influential figures in American politics in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Working always behind the scenes, he played a major role in 
shaping America's response to the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and to the growing global crisis that led, eventually, to U.S. 
involvement in the second World War. Though his official titles 
were inconsequential, Cohen quickly emerged as a key adviser to 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, taking responsibility over a wide 
range of domestic and foreign policy matters. 
It is impossible to assess Cohen's role in New Deal 
Washington except in the context of his relationship with Thomas 
Gardiner Corcoran, who served in a similar capacity in the first 
years of the Roosevelt administration. For several years, Cohen 
and "Tommy the Cork" were linked in an unusual partnership, 
working closely together to write legislation, lobby Congress, and 
generally serve as go-betweens in the growingly complex bureau-
cratic structure of the federal government. Their role in the New 
Deal era is best summed up by their popular nickname-"The 
Gold Dust Twins"-after a 1930s soap advertisement that urged 
American housewives to "let the Gold Dust Twins do your work." 
Though I am writing Cohen's biography, Corcoran fig-
ures heavily in the New Deal chapters. Furthermore, Cohen and 
Corcoran remained life-long friends, and their relationship re-
mains one of the central issues in the book. Their relationship is 
important in another way, too: for the political scientist, Cohen 
and Corcoran's life and work provides an extraordinary vehicle to 
view American and global politics in the 1930s and 1940s. For 
while Cohen and Corcoran were by no means at the top of the 
Washington power structure, they were very definitely at its 
center. Close to such key figures as FDR himself, Supreme Court 
Justices Felix Franfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis 
Brandeis, and congressional leaders like House Majority Leader 
(and later Speaker) Sam Rayburn andJamesF. Byrnes, Cohen and 
Corcoran were involved, directly or indirectly, in an extraordinary 
number of the key events and decisions of the Roosevelt era. They 
thus allow the political biographer to analyze afresh the events of 
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this critical period in U.S. and world history, and provide new 
insight into the political philosophy and working style of the first 
modern administration in American history. Because the Roosev-
elt administration was so influential in shaping the modern 
American political system and in helping to create the post-war 
world political order , a study of the lives and work of Cohen and 
Corcoran tells us a great deal about the world in which we 
ourselves live. 
Such a biography, however, presents a variety of difficul-
ties and challenges. Some of these, of course, are the same as those 
which face any biographer. Others are unique. In this paper I want 
to focus on the literary and scholarly challenges presented by a 
biography of men whose influence, while obviously great, was 
frequently exercised in secret; whose activities were frequently 
undertaken anonymously or under other people's names; whose 
"paper trails" are minimal, misleading, or both; and whose ex-
ploits and contributions are unknown even to many historians of 
the period. Most of all, I wish to highlight some of the benefits 
and some of the dangers inherent in writing a biography of men 
who worked for-but who were not themselves-major political 
figures . 
I 
Ben Cohen and Tommy Corcoran first worked together in 1933, 
when Cohen was brought to Washington by Felix Frankfurter to 
work on the Securities Act of 1933. Although nearly four years 
had passed since the collapse of the stock market in October 1929, 
there was still no significant federal regulation of the securities 
industry when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in March 1933. 
The new president quickly made stock market reform a priority. 
As a first step, he and his advisers proposed a measure , modeled 
on the British Companies Act, that required those who offered 
securities for sale to disclose a variety of information to prospec-
tive buyers. 
Unfortunately, the first efforts at producing an effective 
"truth in securities" bill were an utter failure, and by April 1933 
Roosevelt needed help . Frankfurter brought Cohen and Corcoran 
together with James Landis-who would become the first chair-
man of the Securities Exchange Commission-and charged them 
with producing a viable and effective securities bill. The Cohen-
Corcoran-Landis draft eventually became the Securities Act of 
1933, and marked the beginning of the Cohen-Corcoran partner-
ship. 
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Cohen, at the time, was nearly 40. The son of Jewish 
immigrants from Poland and Lithuania, Cohen attended the 
University of Chicago, graduating with honors at the age of 19-
with, it was said, the highest grades the University had ever 
recorded. By 21 he had earned his law degree and had moved on 
to do graduate work with Frankfurter at the Harvard Law School; 
before the age of 30, he had served as a lawyer for the U.S. 
Shipping Board, as an adviser to Julian Mack and the American 
Zionists at the Versailles Peace Talks, and as counsel to the 
American Zionist office in London. Among other things, he 
helped to write the Palestine Mandate. 1 
In the early 1920s, Cohen returned to the United States, 
setting up in the private practice of law on Wall Street. He became 
an active investor in the wild days of the 1920s, amassing what 
even today would be considered a solid fortune in stocks (he was 
said to be the largest single shareholder in the Chrysler Corpora-
tion).2 By the late 1920s most if not all of his income came from 
investments-he even listed his occupation for tax purposes as 
"lawyer and investor. "3 While in New York, Cohen found time to 
assist in the preparation of progressive legislation in the state 
capital of Albany, and continued to assist the Zionist movement 
in Palestine, focusing on economic development questions. When 
Frankfurter needed help in drafting the Securities Act, therefore, 
Cohen was an obvious choice: a brilliant legal mind with a gift for 
writing legislation and an impressive background in high finance. 
Corcoran, by contrast, was a relative newcomer. Born in 
1900 to a politically active Irish-American family in Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island, Corcoran graduated at the top of his class at Brown 
University and then at Harvard Law School. There, he too met 
Frankfurter, who persuaded him to take an extra year of legal 
education in preparation for a career in law education. 4 The 
following year-1926- 7-Corcoran was selected by Frankfurter 
to go to Washington to serve as law clerk to Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes . All of this, while exciting and interesting, kept Corcoran 
away from his professed goal-which was, as he put it, to go to 
Wall Street and make a million dollars. 5 He accomplished the first 
part of that quest in 1927, when he joined the influential Wall 
Street firm of Cotton, Franklin. The second part proved more 
difficult, however; Corcoran arrived on Wall Street too late to 
really benefit from the run-up of stocks in the 1920s, and just in 
time to be hit by the October 1929 crash. For the next two years, 
he suffered through Wall Street's depression, doing the work of 
two or three men and making, at least in relative terms, next to 
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nothing. When the opportunity came to go back to Washington in 
1931, Corcoran jumped at it. That opportunity came in the form 
of an appointment to the staff of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, a bipartisan agency set up under President Herbert 
Hoover to provide capital for the reorganization of banks and 
other large corporations hit hard by the growing Depression. 
When Roosevelt came to power in March 1933, Corcoran 
was so disappointed with the new president's inaugural address 
that he almost went back to New York; Holmes persuaded him to 
stay, and then Frankfurter tapped him to work with Cohen and 
Landis on the Securities bill. 
Cohen and Corcoran became friends almost instantly, and 
their relationship was, for both men, unique. Cohen was a loner; 
a quiet, reserved, and retiring man. His kind and gentle manner, 
his unpretentiousness, and his generosity made him beloved by 
many, but he was close to very few. Corcoran, by contrast, was 
robust and gregarious. He made friends easily, and fit comforta-
bly with men and women from every stratum of New Deal society. 
He could entertain the president with Irish ballads; drink whiskey 
with the Texas congressional delegation; charm the Washington 
secretaries (one of whom he married); and hold his own with Wall 
Street executives or local political bosses. His aggressiveness and 
brashness caused him to make as many enemies as friends, 
however, and ultimately caused him to break with several of the 
few real friends he had. Only with Ben Cohen was his friendship 
constant from the early 1930s until the end of their lives. 
Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis began work on the securities 
bill on April 7, 1933. A first draft was prepared by April 10; a 
second draft, produced in response to various objections made by 
the House Interstate Commerce Committee, emerged by April 
21.6 By that time it was already clear that Cohen and Corcoran 
were getting on famously but that Landis and Cohen had difficulty 
working together. 7 Nevertheless, the threesome produced a draft 
bill that substantially modified the administration's original pro-
posal. Like the British Companies Act, the Cohen-Corcoran-
Landis draft required registration of all new securities and full 
disclosure of a variety of financial details. Unlike the original 
administration proposal, however, the new bill was specifically 
adapted to the rapidly evolving complexity of modem finance, 
and ensured for flexible administration by granting the Federal 
Trade Commission a wide variety of discretionary powers. Cohen's 
major contribution was to couple this administrative flexibility 
with a detailed schedule of disclosure requirements written di-
rectly into the statute itself. This combination of statutory 
specificity and administrative discretion remains a model statute. 
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The bill, moreover, closed a major loophole by extending the 
reach of the measure not only to the primary issuers of securities 
but also to underwriters, lawyers, accountants, appraisers, and 
others involved in the securities industry. 8 Despite the objections 
of the business community, the Cohen-Corcoran-Landis bill 
passed the House and survived essentially intact through a confer-
ence with the Senate . It became law on May 27, 1933. 
Cohen and Corcoran played major roles in the other two 
major pieces of New Deal securities legislation: the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act of 1935. Their draft of the Securities Exchange Act, largely 
written by Cohen, would have fundamentally restructured Ameri-
can finance. The draft mandated that 
(1) credit for exchange trading should be se-
verely restricted; (2) the activities of individ-
ual exchange members should be clearly de-
fined and circumscribed in order to make pre-
cise the relationship between members and 
clients and in order to force the exchanges to 
fulfill their primary obligation as a public 
marketplace; (3) trading by directors, officers, 
and principle stockholders of listed corpora-
tions should be subject to public scrutiny and 
legal redress; ( 4) the financial affairs of listed 
corporations should be a matter of public rec-
ord. 
Cohen, moreover, would have given the Federal Trade Commis-
sion "almost plenary power" to regulate the stock exchanges. 9 
The bill almost perfectly reflects the philosophical underpinnings 
of the New Deal: it dealt strictly, even harshly, with the abuses of 
capitalism as practiced on Wall Street, but it did so not to destroy 
Wall Street, but to save it. It was a liberal, reformist bill, but it was 
written by a successful Wall Street insider. 
Cohen's draft was brilliantly crafted, but it suffered from 
a variety of political faults. First, Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis 
had produced a draft bill without a clear mandate from or the 
specific support of President Roosevelt. Their original commis-
sion to write the bill came informally, from Max Lowenthal and 
Ferdinand Pecora, who had close connections to Senator Duncan 
Fletcher (D-Fla.). The threesome had only "a display of interest" 
from White House aide Rexford Tugwell to indicate White House 
support. They were given no clear policy guidance from either 
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Congress or the president. Moreover, they had distributed their 
draft within only a narrow circle centered around Sen. Fletcher 
and Rep. Sam Rayburn, and had failed even to anticipate-much 
less to assuage-the concerns of the business community. When 
President Roosevelt called for securities legislation in February 
1934, Fletcher and Rayburn had the Cohen-Corcoran-Landis bill 
at the ready, and introduced it immediately. But the president's 
battle cry was vague and did not specifically endorse the approach 
of the Cohen-Corcoran-Landis bill. 10 
Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis were blindsided by the 
extent of the business community's opposition to their bill, and by 
the speed and skill with which that opposition was marshalled. 
Richard Whitney, the president of the New York Stock Exchange, 
came to Washington to direct the opposition to the bill personally, 
occupying an entire floor of the Willard Hotel with his troops. 11 
Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis also found themselves caught 
between warring factions within the administration, including the 
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and the 
Department of Commerce. 
The ensuing battle brought Cohen and Corcoran into the 
public spotlight for the first time, battling a well-organized and 
determined foe. Their reaction to this challenge gave them their 
first experience in learning to play the Washington power game. 
When Corcoran went to testify in defense of the bill, he found that 
his opponents had outmaneuvered him: to his surprise, the com-
mittee hearing was public, not private; and the business lobby had 
arranged for their own lawyer to sit beside the committee and 
cross-examine the witness! Corcoran's natural talents and the 
force of his personality got him through the crisis, however; he 
reacted to this trying situation, as the historian Arthur Schlesinger 
put it, with "limitless aplomb," relishing the give-and-take like an 
aroused streetfighter. 1 
For the first time, Cohen and Corcoran had to learn to 
master the political process. They learned to size up the political 
realities and balance them against their own policy preferences. 
They engaged in secret negotiations and compromise with busi-
ness leaders, executive officials, and congressional power bro-
kers. They learned to play the House off against the Senate. 13 
When they could not achieve what had seemed to them the key 
element of their ~:!l namely keeping the Federal Trade Com-
mission in control of the administration of the statute-they 
accepted reality and moved forward to ensure that the alterna-
tive-the newly created Securities Exchange Commission-would 
not be "captured" by Wall Street interests. 
123 
Above all, perhaps, Cohen and Corcoran discovered that 
one role the subordinate could play on behalf of his politically 
more visible superiors was the very simple one of taking the heat. 
Corcoran and Cohen were subjected to a wide variety of denun-
ciations on the floor of Congress, even charged with being 
communistic and anti-capitalist (that they lived with other New 
Dealers in a Georgetown residence known as "The Little Red 
House on R Street" did not help matters). Corcoran later wrote 
Frankfurter that "Ray Maley, Pecora, Sam Rayburn, and [Vice 
President John Nance] Garner have been magnificent .... 
Otherwise we kids would have taken the beating alone. " 14 In fact, 
though, it was Corcoran and Cohen who performed the service to 
their superiors and not the other way around. 
A similar lesson was to be learned the following year in the 
fight over the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. Cohen, who 
had been appointed counsel to the National Power Policy Com-
mittee, wrote the first draft of the bill at the request of Federal 
Trade Commissioner Robert Healy. Though he knew that Roosev-
elt believed holding companies "should be abolished," Cohen 
proceeded nonetheless to write a bill that did "not outlaw the 
holding company but regulates and restricts the use of the holding 
company form and provides a mechanism through which, over a 
period of time, existing holding company structures may be 
simplified, and their field limited to a sphere which their economic 
advantages may be demonstrable. "15 Perhaps influenced by his 
experience with the Securities Exchange Act, Cohen had forged 
a bill that would essentially achieve the president's objectives but 
which would be far more politically attractive than any attempt to 
destroy the holding companies outright. For one thing, he wanted 
to ensure that "Congress feels that the particular bill is their bill 
and not the bill of the executive." 16 Roosevelt insisted, however, 
and Cohen redrafted the bill to include the so-called "death 
sentence" provision giving the SEC the authority to dissolve 
utility holding companies outright after January 1, 1940. 
The ensuing fight over the Holding Companies Act was 
messy and vicious, and Cohen and Corcoran were at the center of 
it. The Utilities Companies carried out an extraordinary lobbying 
effort, enlisting powerful allies, especially in the House. Political 
considerations, of course, were also a factor. In the end the fight 
boiled down to the "death sentence" provision; the Senate adopted 
it, the House did not. The provision was eventually defeated in 
conference, and the president signed the amended bill. 
Throughout the process Roosevelt let Cohen and Corco-
ran take the blame for the death penalty provision, which was 
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added originally at his own insistence. And blamed they were. As 
Cohen described it later, 
The atmosphere was super-charged with 
charges that the Congressmen were being used 
as rubber stamps ... that no one knew or 
understood anything about the bill but a couple 
of young men-hot heads-with no political 
or practical experience. Every effort ... was 
put forth to sow the seeds of suspicion and 
distrust between the Senate and House. Tales 
were carried back and forth to make the lead-
ers of each committee feel that the leader of the 
other was trying to double-cross him, every 
petty jealousy was played upon. 17 
One Republican Senator, Ralph Owen Brewster of Maine, had 
indicated his support of the administration bill to Corcoran, then 
turned around and denied he had ever offered such support. 
Moreover, he charged that Corcoran had threatened that if Brewster 
did not support FDR on the death sentence provision, the president 
"would find it necessary to stop construction on the Passa-
maquoddy Dam in my district." Brewster's charge touched off a 
formal congressional investigation, which fully vindicated Corco-
ran but which, in the meantime, played into the hands of the bill's 
opponents. 
The Public Utilities Holding Company Act was subse-
quently challenged in the federal courts, with Ben Cohen in charge 
of the government's defense. The utilities companies engineered 
their own test case before a sympathetic judge in Baltimore, MD, 
which took the form of a suit brought by a creditor against a 
bankrupt holding company. Thus the government was reduced to 
the minor role of appearing as an amicus curiae. Cohen, however, 
devised a counter-strategy: he simply refused to contest the 
Baltimore suit, allowing his opponents to win the battle but 
effectively postponing the war. Cohen continued to refuse to 
contest similar suits until he found his own test case . Then he 
argued it brilliantly, and won. 18 
The battles over the securities acts and the Public Utilities 
Holding Company Act clearly illustrate Cohen and Corcoran's 
role in the Roosevelt administration. Though they held no 
important formal offices, and no specified duties, they fulfilled a 
key function in a period of rapid expansion of the federal 
government's size, complexity, and functions: they provided a 
vital link between the legislative, executive, and judicial depart-
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ments, and provided a measure of coordination and control 
between the executive departments. At a time when there were 
few formal mechanisms for bridging the gaps created by the 
American constitutional system of the separation of powers, 
Cohen and Corcoran provided an informal one. At times they 
functioned as congressional committee staff; at other times, as 
White House staff. When necessary, they could carry messages 
from the justices of the Supreme Court to Roosevelt, or from the 
president to key congressmen. They provided liaison between, 
for example, the Justice Department and the power agencies in 
order to coordinate strategy over the handling of the Public 
Utilities cases. 
It is often asked how the American system of government, 
designed in an age when the functions of the federal government 
at home and abroad were sharply limited, manages to function in 
the twentieth century as well as it does. Since the great expansion 
of federal power in the 1930s and 1940s, a variety of functional 
relationships between the various power centers in Washington 
have evolved and multiplied. In the early stages of the expansion, 
however, the ability of the government to manage its increasing 
responsibilities was greatly enhanced by the kind of informal 
networking and power brokering practiced by Cohen and Corco-
ran. In many ways, in fact, the more formalized system of today 
evolved directly from the Cohen and Corcoran model. 
The three securities laws which they helped write were in 
a very real sense Cohen and Corcoran' s baptism under fire in the 
political arena. By 1936 they had established themselves as 
fixtures in New Deal Washington. They had proved their talents 
as draftsmen and as lobbyists, and had proven their loyalty to 
Roosevelt, Frankfurter, and key congressional leaders. They 
were playing an increasingly important role as Roosevelt's 
speech writers, as his eyes and ears in the political field, and as his 
personal operatives. 
They had also learned some important lessons. The 
Securities Exchange Act taught them that they could not be 
successful if they merely served as technical advisers on specific 
issues and left it to others to guage the political winds and adjust 
accordingly. The securities fights also taught them the essential 
vulnerability inherent in their positions as unofficial staff aides: 
they could be used and manipulated by their friends-meaning 
their political superiors-who might employ them as decoys or 
bargaining chips or enlist them for unsavory tasks (as when FDR 
had them carry the brunt of the "death penalty"); and they could 
become the front men for attack by their enemies, who found them 
easier and more vulnerable targets than the men they worked for. 
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In both cases they provided an invaluable service; but how could 
they protect themselves in the process? 
n 
By far the most effective way Cohen and Corcoran learned to 
protect themselves was to develop what has come to be known as 
a "passion for anonymity." When the Brownlow Commission (set 
up by FDR in 1936 to study ways of addressing the president's 
increasingly obvious need for formal staff support) used that 
phrase to describe the kind of mind-set necessary for a presidential 
adviser, they more than likely had Cohen and Corcoran in mind. 
For Cohen and Corcoran soon discovered that they could be most 
effective in pursuing both their own agenda and the president's by 
staying as much as possible outside the public eye. Keeping a low 
profile reduced their vulnerability to attack from the opposition, 
and, in the long run, made them more useful to their superiors as 
well. 
It is commonly assumed that the "passion for anonymity" 
is a sort of character trait, and indeed many New Dealers assumed 
that Cohen especially relished the background role to which he 
had grown accustomed. Frustrated with not being taken seriously 
by the State Department, for example, Cohen asked in January 
1945 to be appointed Counselor. Roosevelt rebuffed him, how-
ever, and Cohen was so unhappy about being kept on the sidelines 
that he briefly left government service altogether. 19 Cohen indeed 
was quiet and unassuming, and he did turn down a federal 
judgeship when it was offered to him.20 Even so, his passion for 
anonymity had its limits. 
For Corcoran, however, the habit of keeping out of the 
public eye was clearly an acquired trait. The ebullient and 
gregarious Corcoran had to restrain himself deliberately out of 
self-defense. Until around 1934, for example, he wrote long 
letters to Frankfurter and others, describing his own activities and 
the political scene in marvelous detail. In that year-apparently 
as a result of the adverse publicity in the Securities Exchange Act 
controversy-Corcoran' s letters become more and more guarded. 
Eventually, it appears, he learned to enjoy operating in secrecy. 
He began making sensitive phone calls from pay phones (his 
phone was tapped, in fact, during the Truman administration), and 
he depended more and more on personal contacts instead of 
written communications. When in the 1940s he aided Army Air 
Corps General Claire Chennault in forming the American Volun-
teer Force that fought in China prior to American involvement in 
World War II, he and his partners communicated by code, and 
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formed increasingly complex and arcane legal arrangements to 
hide their involvement. Later in life, when Corcoran had become 
an influential Washington lawyer-lobbyist, his numerousclients-
including the United Fruit Company and the Republic of China-
learned to appreciate his acquired passion for secrecy. The 
professional necessity of guarding his client's interests combined 
with the sensitive nature of much of his work to make him a kind 
of shadowy figure in Washington, operating behind the scenes, 
pulling strings, never showing his hand. The image of secrecy 
itself became a source of political power, for, not knowing exactly 
how much power he actually wielded, friends and enemies alike 
tended to estimate his power on the high side. 
Corcoran did not develop this passion for secrecy quickly 
enough to prevent him from gaining a reputation as the 
administration's hatchet man in the 1930s. In 1937 he managed 
the campaign to "pack" the Supreme Court by replacing hostile 
older justices with younger ones friendly to the New Deal. When 
the Court-packing plan became a political debacle, Corcoran took 
much of the blame. The following year, Roosevelt enlisted 
Corcoran' s help in his attempt to "purge" the Democratic Party of 
anti-new Deal conservatives. The purge failed also, and again 
Corcoran took the fall. Corcoran's increasingly negative reputa-
tion led in part to his break with Roosevelt in the 1940s and to the 
ending of his public career; he had outlived his usefulness to FDR, 
and was too much of a political liability to be appointed to any 
important position within the administration. Lacking money, 
and feeling betrayed, Corcoran left the administration for private 
life. 
Cohen too fell naturally into a less public role. In 1940, he 
was the principal architect of the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, 
under which the United States traded old navy ships to Britain in 
return for the right to use British navy bases. The arrangement 
seemed to violate the Neutrality Act (the Attorney General had 
ruled a few months before, in fact, that a similar arrangement 
involving torpedo boats was illegal) and was, moreover, politi-
cally dangerous, especially since 1940 was a presidential election 
year. Cohen devised an elaborate and ingenious legal argument 
to justify the plan, however, and then orchestrated a major public 
relations campaign to garner public support. His involvement in 
the Destroyers deal-a measure which was critical to the British 
war effort at the time and which became the precursor to the more 
elaborate Lend-Lease program-was kept so far in the back-
ground, however, that Cohen has received almost no credit in the 
history books. 
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Cohen and Corcoran's "passion for anonymity"-even 
when artificially self-imposed-served them well. For their 
biographer, however, it is more problematical. Because they 
operated in the shadows, committing less and less to paper and 
doing more and more in other people's names, they left a very 
minimal paper trail. The Corcoran Papers are voluminous, and 
give a general idea of what he was up to.21 But they do not provide 
a clear or unambiguous account of his activities on a detailed, day-
to-day level. The Cohen Papers, by contrast, are extremely 
limited in scope-a total of 26 boxes in the main collection, plus 
scattered materials elsewhere. 22 I have at times summed up the 
difficulties involved in writing such a biography by saying-with 
what seems like only a little exaggeration-that Cohen didn't 
save anything, and Corcoran didn't write anything down. 
Attempting to reconstruct the multifarious activities of 
two such men from a limited record poses dangers of two varie-
ties. It is possible to understate their activities, since much of what 
they did is not recorded in clear and unambiguous terms. More 
often, one is tempted to overstate their influence on events. For 
they frequently used their lack of public exposure to give the 
appearance, as I have said, that their power was greater than it 
really was. Thus those who knew them, even fairly well, are not 
always able accurately to assess their importance, and even 
contemporary accounts often contain distortions and exaggera-
tions. Moreover, their own recollections-especially Corcoran' s-
are notoriously unreliable, as they frequently adopted a deliberate 
strategy of either exaggerating or downplaying their own activi-
ties to serve particular political purposes. (One example comes to 
mind. Corcoran played a minor role in expediting the building of 
National Airport in Washington, DC in the late 1930s-an effort 
that was appreciated by the military, since the new Pentagon 
building was to be built on the site of the old airstrip and 
construction could not begin until after National was opened for 
business. Years later, in his unpublished memoirs, Corcoran 
declared, "I built that airport.") 
Writing a biography of men who were always in the 
background does have its advantages, however. It provides a 
unique perspective on an extraordinary period in American and 
world history . All too often biographies of politicians or govern-
ment officials attribute to the principals ideas, policies, or pro-
grams that were, in fact, greatly influenced or even conceived and 
carried out entirely by staff members. Biographers of Roosevelt, 
for example, have a tendency to ignore or forget the fact that many 
of his most famous speeches were written by others, including 
Cohen and Corcoran. In a way, therefore, writers of more standard 
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biographies face the identical problem of separating the actual 
influence of their subjects from the influence of those who 
surround them and work for them. It is simply easier for the 
biographer of Roosevelt to ignore this problem than it is for the 
biographer of Cohen or Corcoran. 
III 
Allow me to conclude with a brief comment on the dual biography 
issue. Although my project is not technically a dual biography, 
but focuses only on Cohen, in the chapters on the New Deal the 
close working relationship of Cohen and Corcoran gives it a 
similar flavor, and raises similar scholarly and literary issues. I 
want to focus on just one. 
When writing about a man who was, at least for a while, 
part of a team or parmership, it is tempting at times to fall into the 
habit of thinking of the two subjects as a sort of corporate entity-
Cohen-and-Corcoran, as their friends and critics alike called them 
in the 1930s. Often it is difficult, in fact, to separate the two in 
terms of their individual contributions to specific projects. This 
problem is especially magnified during the New Deal, for many 
of the programs and policies of the New Deal were in effect group 
efforts-the New Dealers lived together, worked together, and 
socialized together, and ideas were traded back and forth, bor-
rowed, and copied at a dizzying pace. It is impossible, for 
example, to determine except in general terms precisely what 
Cohen contributed to the Securities Act as compared to Landis of 
Corcoran. Even trying to do so can result in a distorted picture of 
the process by which policy was made in New Deal Washington. 
There is the further danger of reacting in the opposite 
direction, and viewing Cohen and Corcoran as two sides of the 
same coin. It is especially tempting to do this because so many 
viewed them this way in their own lifetime, and because literary 
pressures may create temptations to create neat or catchy charac-
terizations. To many, Cohen was "the saint," an unassuming, 
scholarly idealist who labored selflessly to serve the public 
interest; while Corcoran was an ambitious, self-interested politi-
cal operator, the "public interest lawyer" who was "working 
against what he had done" in the New Deal. 23 In the words of one 
book on the New Deal, Cohen was the "Dreamer," Corcoran the 
"Dealer. "24 Corcoran also contributed to this image problem. Late 
in life, Cohen lamented that Corcoran' s enemies-of whom there 
were by then many-"pretended to take seriously his sputterings 
about power as if he were only concerned with power for power's 
sake rather than for the vindication of the humanistic values of life 
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which he cherished and esteems beyond their ken. "25 Cohen's 
image, ironically, benefited ~y compa_rison as his pa:rner'~ suf-
fered, until he, too, became akmd of cancatured, two-d1mens1onal 
figure. 
My challenge-as for any biographer-is to capture in 
print the complex, often contradictory reality that Ben Cohen and 
his contemporaries represented in real life, and to use this care-
fully drawn portrait to provide fresh insight into the exrraordinary 
times in which they lived and which they helped to shape. 
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dollars. The Shearson account may or may not have held his 
complete portfolio, and, of course, the value of Cohen's stocks 
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Securities Act of 1933, see generally pp. 42-72. 
7 Corcoran, years later, wrote that "Ben and Jim, both brilliant 
men, were equally highstrung. They would work each other into 
emotional frenzies over such esoteric differences oflegal opinion 
that I could grasp the issues just well enough to arbitrate between 
them." Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 184. Cohen and Landis 
were never close. 
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8Securities Act of 1933 (House Report 152, 73d Cong., 1st. sess., 
1933), pp. 1-29. 
9 Parrish, Securities Regulation, pp. 116-117. 
10 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 456-7. See also Parrish, 
Securities Legislation, pp. 121-2. 
11 Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 164. 
12 Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 464. 
13 Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, p. 181n. 
14 Quoted in Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, pp. 169-70. 
15 Cohen to Robert E. Healy, 23 November 1934, quoted in 
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16 Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 197. 
17Benjamin V. Cohen to Felix Frankfurter, 20 March 1936, Cohen 
papers, LC. 
18 Electric Bond and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938). 
19FDR to Benjamin Victor Cohen, 13 January 1945, FDR Papers, 
President's Secretary's File, Box 140, Roosevelt Library. Cohen 
was ultimately appointed Counselor to the State Department 
under President Harry Truman and Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes. 
2° Charles Burlingham to Benjamin V. Cohen, 22 November 
1944, Charles Burlingham Papers, Box 2, Folder 19, Harvard Law 
School; Francis Biddle to FDR, 27 December 1944, FDR Papers, 
Official File #51-5, Roosevelt Library. 
21 The Corcoran Papers, housed at the Library of Congress, 
comprise over 600 boxes of material. 
22 The Cohen papers are also in the Library of Congress. Addi-
tional material is housed in the National Archives. Because 
Cohen generally did not save copies of outgoing correspondence, 
many of his own letters can be found only in the papers of his 
correspondents. 
23 Joseph Rauh, quoted in Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 465. 
24 Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 465. 
25 Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, p. 466. 
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